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SOCIAL SCIENCE. SUBJECTIMSM. AND THE ART
OF THINKING
BY MCTOR S. VARROS
SEX'ERAL stimulating Ijooks, recently published, re\ive for
much-needed illumination an old question of the utmost impor-
tance. The authors, it is true, imagine that the question is new,
but that is a small matter. Their mistake discloses lack of famili-
arity with the works of "some eminent Victorians," but those works
did not settle the (juestion, and it demands reopening and reconsid-
eration from the viewpoint of modern psychology and modern soci-
ological generalizations.
The question is this : Is there such a thing as a political, s(xnal
or economic science? Do not our passions, prejudices, interests,
fears, hopej. conscious and unconscious, preclude the sort of treat-
ment—rigorous, unbiased, exact, patient—which the term "science"
denotes? If not. how does it happen that in the so-called social
sciences there is little respect for authority, little unity or harmonv,
little effort to know what is established and demonstrated, little faith,
indeed, in the very possibility of establishing and proving theorie*
or propositions? Why do "practical" men entertain such contempt
for the social sciences, and why do we so often hear the objection
that this or that proposal is "only theoretical" and will not work?
In the true and exact sciences there is no distinction between theo-
retical and practical truth. There is no scientific truth that is not
borne out in practice.
On the other hand, if the so-called social sciences are not sciences
at all. what pre\'ents tliem from being such ? Bias, interest, pre-
possession, tradition? Is it difficult or well-nigh impossible for
economists, ethicists. professors of politics and civics, historians, to
put aside class, partisan, race and other prejudices? Are all the
conclusions of the pseudo sciences named "subjective," questionable,
tainted? If so, how can we hope ever to have social sciences?
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John A. Hobson. the radical British economist and publicist, in
his book ertitled Free Thought in the Social Sciences faces frankly
the difficulties just indicated and urges a change of procedure on
the part of the workers in the social sciences. Instead of ignoring
bias, of tacitly assuming that it has been somehow exorcised by writ-
ers, M. Hobson advises recognition of inevitable bias and making
proper allowance for it. We should take it for granted, in other
words, that an aristocrat will fall a victim to the "aristocratic fall-
acy" ; that a member of the middle class will overrate the virtues of
his class and make generalizations that are not justified by the expt
rience of the wage-workers, or the poor farmers and their poorer
tenants, of the struggling professional men and impecunious intellec-
tuals : and, finally, that a trade-unionist will be incapable of treating
fairly and soberly proposals advanced by employers or by thinkers
who take the employer's view of industrial problems. If we do this.
we can openly discount the statements made and accept them not
at par. but at their actual value. In the end. the hypothesis is. the
sum of such duly discounted assertions and affirmations will fur-
nish material for a true science.
Unfortimately, it is easier to propose this method than to apply,
it. \\'hat is a proper discount in any of the cases given for illus-
tration? Will not bias enter into the determination of the discount?
As a matter of fact, it is simply untrue to say that we have ignored
bias and treated it as non-existent. We have always complained
of bias, conscious and unconscious, in alleged contributions to social
theory by writers closely associated with or dependent upon vested
interests. The defense of rent by landlords has always been dis-
counted, as has the defense of high protection by its immediate bene-
ficiaries, or of expropriation of property by "proletarian" econo-
mists, or of religious education in schools by clerical and dogmatic
theologians.
How, then, are we to arrive at truth in connection with the prob-
lems of the social sciences? Common sense is quite ready to give
a satisfactory answer. We must hear all sides, weigh all consider-
ations, compare conclusions, and verify and reverify them wherever
possible. We must endeavor to "see life steadily and see it whole."
and not depend unduly on books. We must watch and interpret
tendencies and facts. In addition, there are always, happily, some
indisputably disinterested thinkers who rise above class and caste
prejudices and reveal a passion for justice and pure truth. The
leaders of a reform movement are not necessarily members of the
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class or group in whose behalf the movement is planned and carried
on. The special pleaders are not necessarily beneficiaries of the
institution or practice they seek to defend against the assaults of
outsiders. Things social are not as simple as the foe of bias is apt
to imagine. Intellectual integrity, imagination, sympathy, love of
accuracv and straight thinking have played no unimportant i)arts
in advancing the social sciences and in promoting sound social im-
provements. The industrial and political reforms of the last fifty
years— for example, legal recognition of trade unionism, accident
compensation, collective bargaining, the enfranchisement of the
workmg classes and of women, progressive income and inheritance
taxation, the initiative and referendum, the direct primary, com-
mission government, the city manager plan, profit-sharing, employe
ownership of stock in corporations, and the like, have been con-
ceived and achieved despite the opposition of prejudiced and inter-
est-blinded groups and factions. If bias has not been fatal to prog-
ress in the past, it cannot be fatal to healthy future progress. Bias
may retard wholesome progress, but does not prevent it. In the un-
ceasing conflict of social forces and rival interests, propaganda, mis-
representation, exaggeration, misunderstanding born of suspicion
and dislike are severally inevitable, but in the end adjustments and
compromises are efifected under the direction of reason rather than
of emotion.
The real difficulty under which the social sciences labor is the
extremely limited opportunity of experimentation and verification
which they enjoy. Human life is not a laboratory. Propositions
and hypotheses cannot be tested in politics or in economic relations
as chemical, physical and other hypotheses are tested. There are
object lessons in history and in contemporaneous experience, but it
is impossible to prevent divergent interpretations of them. The
deepest thinkers have admitted that the baffling complexity of social
phenomena enjoin a wholesome suspicion of severe logic and of the
geometrical method of demonstration in that realm. Nothing really
repeats itself in human life; there are always new factors, subtle
and imponderable, that "make a difference" and forbid the confident
drawing of parallels. Ancient Greece cannot teach us how to gov-
ern the heterogeneous American democracy, spread over a vast con-
tinent. The Swiss Referendum somehow does not always work
effectively in the United States. Institutions and principles are not
eternal, but correlated with, and dependent upon, time, place, char-
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acter of the population, educational status, tradition and background.
We must reckon with these facts, not blink them.
Compare the fate of discoveries or new theories in the exact sci-
ences with the fate of sociological theories. How was Mendel's the-
ory of heredity established? By controlled observation, experi-
mentation, verification. How was the doctrine of Relativity demon-
strated? Fiy sundry careful and painstaking observations and tests.
But let the great majority of criminologists advocate the abolition
of capital punishment, and what happens? A minority challenges
their conclusion and demands the sort and riuality of proof that can-
not be furnished by social science. Argue that capital punishment
is futile, non-deterrent, brutalizing, and you are told that your
notions are arbitrary. The facts you ofifer are rejected as insuffi-
cient, or irrelevant, or both. No two states or countries are similar
in every respect, and no state or country is static. The opponents of
any change insist that "conditions" justify a given law in one case
and preclude it in another.
For a century or more economists have argued the question of
free trade vs. protection. The majority of the professors of social
economies everywhere are free-traders, but the protectionist minor-
ity is unconverted and unashamed. Protection still claims its fer-
vent and erudite defenders. Statistics leave these tories, or heretics,
cold. The same figures are often used by both sides to prove
diametrically opposite conclusions.
In these circumstances, it is perfectly "human" and natural that
the average man, the business man, the self-styled practical man.
should turn a deaf ear to academic thinkers whose teachings, if
carried into effect, would reduce his profits, lessen his power or
afifect his prestige. Our consciences are very elastic, and we readily
find justifications or excuses for our action or inaction. What bet-
ter excuse is there than this—that "the doctors disagree"' ; that the
supposed scientific authorities are divided on the question which
concerns us and in respect of which this or that school of thought
demands of us conduct inimical to our interests and contrary to our
inclinations?
Indeed, a recent writer, H. Ward, in a clever and plausible book
on "Thobbing"—a term coined by him to denote what has been
called "rationalizing," or the formation of opinions and beliefs by
so-called reasoning that is not reasoning at all. but the more or less
deliberate use of sophistry to justify prejudices and borrowed dog-
mas
—
proves to his own satisfaction that even the greatest philoso-
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phers and most iconoclastic thinkers seek to palm off. as it were, in
the name of reason, personal opinions, born of emotions and desires,
for which they furnish little or no evidence worthy of the name.
According to ]\Ir. Ward, even the Pragmatists and the Behaviorists
are guilty of thobbing : at a ecrtain stage in their respective argu-
ments they lose sight of scientific method, of their own alleged pos-
tulates and premises, and advance astonishing conclusions in no wise
established by the preceding argument. ]\Ir. Ward is not so naive
as to believe that ever)- proposition in the social sciences is ca])ablc
of rigorous demonstration, but he objects to the tacit assumption
that thobbing is a satisfactory substitute for thinking, or that the
social sciences are free to dispense with scientihc proof to the end
of time while claiming to be classed with the real sciences. He would
distinguish between thinking and thobbing, and draw a clear, bold
line between the two processes. An author of a work on ethics, or
economics, or go\'ernment. might for example, serve notice upon
his readers that thinking has ended and thobbing begun at a certain
natural division in the argument or exposition! Or. if the author
does not know where the line is to be drawn, he might submit his
work to a critic and ask him to identify and label the propositions
that ha\e only thobbing back of them.
^^'e are brought here, in all seriousness, to consideration of a
very different sort of book on some aspects of the problems raised
by Messrs. Hobson and Ward. The reference is to Prof. Graham
Wallas's much-lauded \-olume entitled The .Irt of TJiouqht. a vol-
ume which has been commended to educators, to psychologists anrl
to would-be reformers of society as a preventive of hasty generaliza-
tions and sweeping indictments or wholesale apologies for certain
institutions or practices.
Mr. Wallas says many thought-provoking things, and his analy-
sis of the piocess of thought is useful up to a certain point. Rut. as
we shall see. and as Prof. John Dewey has very candidly shown.
]\Ir. W^allas overlooks a very vital fact and is led by that strange
oversight—especialy strange in a writer on political and social ques-
tions—to commit serious errors.
We do not. according to Mr. Wallas, teach the art of thought in
our schools and colleges. Yet thought is an art. and much of it is
understandable and teachable. If this supremely important art were
properly taught, fewer fallacies would be socially current, the wicked
propagandist would meet with more difficulties than Ire now en^
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counters, and the path of the wise and righteous would be corre-
spondingly smoother and freer.
To show just how the art of thought, or of straight, clear, logi-
cal thinking, can be taught. Mr. Wallas separates the process of
thought into four distinct phases—namely. Preparation, or the period
of accumulating knowledge and correctly classifying it ; Incubation,
the period of deliberate abstention from work on the material ob-
tained and mastered : Illumination, or the period during which ideas,
flashes of :nsight and of new theory appear, and. finally. Verifica-
tion, a period of uncertain length dependent upon the quality and
boldness of the theory or conception tentatively reached.
It scarcely needs saying that Mr. Wallas realizes the impossibil-
ity of controlling or teaching either incubation or illumination. But
he rightly holds that we can be taught how to gather, digest and
classify data, how to demand sufficient and adequate data on any
subject under consideration, and how to verify, test and reverify.
Since, however, the importance of the incubation and illumination
stages is admittedly greater than that of the other two stages, the
conclusion emerges that the real art of thought cannot be made a
matter of systematic teaching. Mr. Wallas himself affirms that
much of the success of original thinkers-—a Darwin, a Wallace, an
Einstein, a Pasteur, a Koch— is due to their ability to grasp and
hold the vague intimations, the adumbrations, the rays of faint light
which mark the phase of illumination.
Mr. Wallas' book, however, is open to the deeper criticism can-
didly passed upon it by Professor Dewey, who. in a notice of that
work in The Netv Republic, wrote as follows
:
".
. . It is obvious that there is an art of thought with respect
to matters of physical science or technolosfv. What is lacking- is
simply an art of thought with respect to human afifairs comparable
with that already attained in physical matters. This contrast raises
an interesting problem, probably the most important problem which
the world now faces. Is there a legitimate possibility of an art of
social thought which is one with increase of control, or is the idea
a dream? If it is a legitimate possibility, how is it to be realized?
Such a question, however, is in no sense a psychological prob-
lem. The development of natural scence is not due to the fact that
individual thinkers have learned a better intimately personal art
of managing their own thoughts. It is due to the formation of an
objective technique of instruments and external procedures together
with the accumulation of prior results which direct from without
S(!CI.\L SCIENCE. SUBJECTIVISM. ART OF THINKING 543
the growth of pertinent problems and fruitful hypotheses. But it
is the personal and psychological problem alone with which Mr. Wal-
las deals. There is no approach to a consideration of the political
and economic conditions which stand in social affairs in the way of
the development of methods of objecti\e intellectual behavior em-
ploving means which almost automatically direct the thoughts of in-
dividuals as such."
It is not a sufficient answer to Prof. Dewey's remarks to say that
Mr. Wallas was not concerned with objective control of thought
that is too prone to err subjectively. It was his business to empha-
size the contrast between the position and the authority of the exact
sciences with the treatment and lack of authority of the social sci-
ences, and to give some explanation of the disquieting phenomenon.
It was his business to ask why the art of thought is so effectively
and fruitfully applied in one realm and so poorly and haltingly
applied in another.
W'e find ourselves back at the starting point—at the question
whether the part played by bias and prejudice, fear and desire, in
the treatment of social, political, economic and moral issues cannot
be controlled and diminished.
There are shallow radicals who assert that "capitalism" is the
foe of free, disinterested thought and searching, fearless investiga-
tion of the themes of the social sciences. Books have been written
on the efforts of plutocracy to direct college and university teaching,
to suppress new truth because it may undermine monopoly or pro-
mote revolutionary tendencies. That such efforts have been and
still are occasionally made, no intelligent observer would care to
deny. But we have had enough experience with compulsory com-
munism, snvietism, dictatorship of the proletariat, Fascismo, and
brutal reaction sans phrase, to perceive that bias and resistence to
honest, unfettered discussion are by no means the exclusive sins of
"capitalism." If we had Socialism or Syndicalism tomorrow, 1)ias
would be as rampant and injurious in the social sciences as it is
today, or as it was under autocracy and clerical obscurantism.
The question is not of an age or a given social condition. It
cannot be solved by artificial "controls." And. to repeat, Mr. Hob-
son's suggestions in regard to allowances or discounts for bias do
not take us far on the way to a solution.
What is to be done, then ? In the absence of a specific, we have
no choice but to accept the solution of common sense, which, as
already pointed out, is this—that we must peg awav patientlv. hear
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al] sides, lake time for reflection, watch developments, profit by
experiments wherever possible, seek guidance in quarters that are
apparently free from bias, or as free as is humanly possible. We
are bound to believe that in the long run the truth does prevail even
in politics and economics, or in international controversies, despite
national bias, class bias, religious bias, purse bias, race bias, etc. In
thus believing we are not necessarily guilty of "thobbing," for we
are able to point to numerous facts and instances in support of our
position. After all, Adam Smith did influence very considerably
human thought and action, as did Jeremy Bentham, as did Richard
Cobden, as did Luther, as did the American Abolitionists, as did
other groups and individual thinkers and leaders at various periods
of human history, to say nothing of law-givers like Moses, Jesus,
Mohammed, Buddha. After all, moral progress is a fact, not a
mere theory. Political equality, industrial democracy, humaniza-
tion of the treatment of the insane, the defectives, and the criminal,
exemplify moral and social progress. Restriction of child labor, the
shorter wcrk-day, popular education, international arbitration,
leagues and courts for the prevention of aggressive warfare—these
things, and a hundred others, spell and represent genuine progress.
Political economy, sociology, ethics, ciminology, history, have done
something—no one knows how much—to promote those great
himian improvements. Other factors have aided, no doubt, but
ideas have not been futile, have not fallen on deaf ears. There is
thus no ground for excessive pessimism concerning the work of
the social sciences. They are not without honor and weight in
human afifairs. They will probably command increasing respect and
authority os education spreads, as tradition loses its hold, as we
learn to trace the genesis and development of institutions and doc-
trines, and to discuss every belief in a scientific spirit. Lawmakers
and reformers alike will learn to value the opinions and theories
of economists and sociologists, and consult them more and more
when framing statutes. Democracies will not tolerate the dictator-
ships of experts and scholars, but they will accept the advice and
guidance of experts in the domain of political and social legislation
as they now accept the guidance of engineers, physicians and chem-
ists in certain fields.
And that is all that sensible men can ask or expect. It is quite
enough, however, to save democracy and avert either anarchy or
absolutism.
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If democracy can be saved by discussion, reason, intelHgcnce,
tolerant compromise, gradual improvements v^here needed and jus-
tified, as it undoubtedly can, then it follows that western civiliza-
tion and culture are likewise reclaimable and redeemable. Dr.
Oswald Spengler, the erudite German scholar who has taken all
knowledge lor his province, and who, after surveying the diplomacy,
politics, theology, philosophy, economic systems, arts and crafts of
the West cUinounces the decline and fall of the whole organism of
western civilization, seems to have fallen into the error of all funda-
mentalists and dogmatists. He has overlooked the one distinctive
characteristic of modern thought, the characteristic that makes all
talk of decay and death futile and unimpressive, namely, its rela-
tivity and elasticity. We no longer believe that because this or that
institution disappears, or evolves, society is doomed and humanity
irretrievably lost. Autocracy is dead ; industrial tyranny is dead or
dying; religious dogmas and superstitions are dead: morality is
being reshaped and provided with new sanctions ; the arts are mak-
ing bizarre and ingenious experiments : but none of these radical
movements or accomplished revolutionary facts imperil tJie fabric
of human culture and civilization. Dr. Spengler's definitions of cul-
ture and civilization are obviously arbitrary. It is really absurd to
imagine that Pragmatism in philosophy—a movement, bv the way,
already considerably modified by critical realism and other schools
—
or Cezanne and his followers in Art. or Psychoanalysis, or self-deter-
mination and autonomy in politics, are symptoms of decay and
death.
That is civilization which makes for the full development of
human faculty within limits prescribed by reason and the necessity
of considering the rights and claims of one's fellowmen. We are
slowly building up a moral system, a civilization, worthy of the
name. We are socializing the individual and at the same time teach-
ing organized society, or the State, to respect the socialized indi-
vidual. We are humanizing industry, abolishing unfair privilege,
equalizing opportunity, increasing leisure, reducing armaments, re-
stricting warfare, curbing fanatical nationalism, democratizing cul-
ture and knowledge. These tendencies strengthen a civilization in-
stead of undermining it.
Moreover, the East is imitating the West. China and Japan are
borrowing western ideas and institutions. If western civilization
were going to the dogs, eastern civilization would accompanv it. All
humanity is in the same boat, as it were, engaged in the <=;ame quest
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and adventure. No race of people has a monopoly of virtue, spirit-
uality, science, or art. All races are brothers or sisters of one
another. The same thoughts and standards that will "save" the
West will save the East, and in exactly the same way. Peace, jus-
tice, order, co-operation, education, pursuit of science and the fine
arts in freedom—these are the conditions of progress in civilization
everywhere and always.
Dr. Spengler unwittingly illustrates in his portentious and for-
midable work the unscientific character of much of our speculation
in the realm of sociology, philosophy, ethics and aesthetics. His
premises are widely questioned, while his conclusions do not even
necessaril}- flow from his premises. 'Sir. AA'ard would find more
thobbing than thinking in Spengler's volumes, while Mr. Hobson
and others would find plenty of bias and unconscious prejudice there,
as well as personal crotchets and whimsicalities. Well, there is no
immediate help for it. The social sciences are not and never will
be rigorously exact, and human afifairs will always be baffling and
perplexing. But time, tide, experience and criticism somehow con-
trive to separate truth from error, fact from fancy and illusion. We
have some light, and it shows us both the dim goal and the uneven,
thorny path thereto.
